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Aircraft protection for complex threat platforms through 
integrated EWOS application 
R Rudd-Orthner, L S Mihaylova 
Department of Automatic Control and Systems Engineering, The University of 
Sheffield, Mappin Street, Sheffield, S1 3JD, United Kingdom 
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Abstract. The advancement of threats is focusing commanders to consider how to combat 
these complex threats throughout the kill chain including prior to launch and Anti-Access Area 
Denial (A2AD).  To match this technology race, modern platforms have been designed with 
integrated command and control systems and automated Defensive Aids Suites built on 
modular open system architectures incorporating less diverse but more complex software 
driven systems.  The successful operation of these combat systems is reliant upon the 
DYDLODELOLW\ RI DFFXUDWH FRQILJXUHG KDUPRQLVHG DQG ³WLPH VHQVLWLYH´ PLVVLRQ GDWD ZLWKRXW
which the systems may be ineffective.  This paper explores the use of threat analysis 
diagramming techniques, and open architectures tightly integrated with a EWOS life-cycle; to 
develop countermeasures with a measured response beyond the traditional self-protection kill 
chain stages of self-protection.   It introduces how threat analysis prepares understanding for 
simulation and how a countermeasure description language can be used to store and exchange 
countermeasures in a structured form.  This level of intelligence data support and analysis 
coordinated and synchronised across multiple platforms thereby facilitating the complexities of 
force protection higher up the kill chain into an onion of protection mapped to a Venn diagram 
of countermeasure types (design intentions) with differing data needs. 
1.  Introduction 
There is a trend for threat weapon systems to become more complex and this increased complexity 
could be argued to be at least in part due to: the evolution of tactics, the pace of technology 
development and digital modernisation, but also a trend for the broadening roles of threats with the 
reduction of human decision and response times.  This is perhaps more so with the increased potency 
use of autonomous systems as well as the Integration of Air Defence Systems (IADS) and the 
construction of platforms with wider roles (Role Bandwidth).  The rise of the autonomous system is 
developing in all domains: Land, Air, Sea, Space and Cyber.  Autonomous systems do vary in scale 
from unattended gun systems to autonomous Air platforms.  The roles in which these autonomous 
platforms operate in are also broadening and it follows that when combating Integrated Air Defence 
6\VWHPV ,$'6 WKHQ D PDWFKLQJ RI FRPSOH[LW\ PD\ EH UHTXLUHG LQ DQ ³LQWHJUDWHG 'HIHQVLYH $LGV
6\VWHP´ $WUDGLWLRQDOVWUDWHJ\IRUFRPEDWLQJFRPSOH[WKUHDWV\VWHPVOLNH,$'6LVZLWKDLU-strikes.  
This paper embraces the IADS and A2AD problem with an alternative strategy of prior preparation 
analysis in EWOS extending higher up the kill chain to provide more complete simultaneous air 
protection at all levels within an extended kill chain.  It is an alternative solution strategy to hard kill, 
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to counter IADS and A2AD solution alternatively using EWOS provisions, rather than Hard Kill air 
strikes [1] and this would be more applicable to UAS stealth missions.  
The increased roles and capabilities of these complex platforms may cause a single platform to be 
OHVV UROH VSHFLILF DQG SURYLGH D ³SURMHFWLRQ RI SURWHFWLRQ´ UHTXLUHPHQW WR RWKHU SODWIRUPV EXW
combined with this the stakeholder community is also more diverse and mechanisms for 
communication between scientists/engineers, crews and mission production programmers are also 
challenges such that they may all contribute meaningfully and complementary with values from their 
VWDNHKROGHUJURXSV7KH9HQQGLDJUDP>@EHORZVKRZV³6SKHUHVRI,QIOXHQFH´RIGDWDDYDLODELOLW\ 
Protect Platform/Force, Threat or Weapon System and the Defensive Constraints are over laid with 
countermeasure design considerations Decoy, Deception etc.  It may follow that different 
countermeasure considerations are coupled to different available data and form spheres of influence 
toward the countermeasure tactic design. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Venn diagram of CM design considerations and spheres of influence 
 
It follows that consideration of a countermeasure that uses more information from the protected 
platform and less from the Defensive Constrains and Threat or Weapon System, may be a decoy or 
deception as it is using data to make a better more attractive target then the protected platform. Also it 
could be considered that countermeasures with specific information from that threat weapon system 
may be exploiting a weakness and could be more likely to be a disruption, distraction or denial. This 
may lead a consideration to the design intention and the kind of information available, and also that 
using some types of countermeasure could perhaps betray to the enemy the kind and detail of 
information available.  To protect from this betrayal of information the use of some kinds of 
countermeasure design intentions could be reserved to layers lower in an onion of protection within a 
kill chain and are focused to be countered with a counter intention in that onion of protection.  These 
threat intentions and countermeasure counter intention mappings leads to a consideration of the 
WKUHDW¶VFRPSOH[LW\DQGDOD\HUHd approach based on kill chain analysis, while providing a measured 
response at each layer of the onion of protection. 
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2.  Engagement dynamics 
Complex air platforms have the opportunity to both coordinate their countermeasure equipment and 
cooperate between platforms to form cooperative tactics.  A lack of coordination and cooperation 
between platforms has historically caused some recorded losses notably in the naval domain, like the 
³$WODQWLF &RQYH\RU´ GXULQJ WKH )DONODQGV ZDU EHWZHHQ %ULWDLQ DQG $UJHQWLQD >@.  Within an 
engagement, dynamics can be considered in terms of the operator, software and how sensors are 
employed.  In a countermeasure perspective this can change the order that modes or states that ELINT 
emissions appear in, coursing the consideration of understanding a threat and its intentions along a kill 
chain. 
3.  Understanding a threat and the discrimination view 
For illustration purposes and for the de-classification obligation we can consider the S-75 SAM site as 
an example as there is much information available on-line and in literature.    S-75 is a complex threat 
of subsystems working together and was a widely proliferated SAM.  S-75 still remains a serious 
operational threat and illustrates some of the analysis mechanisms. The first part of any analysis is 
recognising patterns and discriminators for those patterns, this forms classifications and identities.  
Visually, as a land system S-75 could be recognised from the air or satellite by its classical distinctive 
star lay-down patterns with six single launchers around a radio locator (engagement radar).  S-75 does 
not act alone but is part of a greater network of associated sensors and systems forming a kill chain.  
Some operating countries may see different associated systems employed in different regions.  It may 
be argued that when preparing platform protection for a threat it is useful to prepare the specifics of 
what that system comprises, how they are linked and the sequences and concurrency of coordination 
for the kill chain.  Ironically this causes a consideration of what the subsystem is, but also what the 
subsystem is not and therefore what are the subsystems tasks and intentions. 
In the S-75 case as the new RF components were not ready from the outset of the development a 
crash programme to develop an extra S-75 variant that re-used S-25 RF components was started.  This 
resulted in ELINT discriminators that can be observed to establish a class of variants of the S-75.  The 
following rainbow spectrum diagram shows what parts of the system may be in-band of sensors. It can 
be additionally use with other axis or be decorated with other factors that may affect detection and 
intercept as well as jamming like power range, polarisation and other equipment limitations in sensing. 
 
Figure 2. S-75 Rainbow spectrum 
 
Also, helpfully the radar silhouette also reflects the ELINT discriminators allowing data 
convergence from imagery (IMINT) and (ELINT).  During this paper the author is using a number of 
diagramming standards that he has formed to aid a threat analysis process to analyse the understanding 
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of a threat. In the example above the Sensor bandwidth are only illustrative and is not real specific 
equipment.  Also, the bands of each of the sub-systems are taken from open sources and there is a list 
of references at the end of this paper. 
As well as considering the ELINT discriminators S-75 also has IMINT and photographic 
discriminators (like the radar silhouette, shadow and aerial view lay-down). 
 
Figure 3. SNR-75 Lumps and bumps discriminators 
Having defined the discriminators and classification of components, the analysis also looks from an 
operational view and this is a similar approach to MODAF [5]. 
4.  The Operational View 
The example diagramming technique shows relative search volumes of the systems used together with 
role designations: Early Warning (EW), Target Acquisition (TA), Height Finding (HF), Target 
Tracking Radar (TTR) and Missile or Weapon Engagement Zone (MEZ/WEZ). This presents an 
expectation of an order of encounter at differing block altitudes levels and operational vignettes 
scenarios, alternatively these diagrams can be 3D and use a multi system lay-downs with geographical 
terrain, thus embracing A2AD impact and the Integration of Air Defence Systems as IADS. 
 
  
Figure 4. SAM System beam volumes and reaches 
 
The way in which a SAM is employed may be in part driven by how data is handed off and what 
system capabilities are provided prior to the hand off.  Knowledge of this may lead us to consider the 
SAM operators tasks that are trying to be conducted within the engagement and any observable 
discriminators we may expect in that engagement.  This will form the SAM kill chain and extends 
from Find/Fix to Prosecute/Effect.  The figure below is another example of the authors diagram 
v
SNR-75 Fan Song A SNR-75 Fan Song B 
SNR-75 Fan Song E SNR-75 Fan Song F 
v
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standards in a simplified form that has taken the ISTAR kill chain (Find, Fix, Recognise, Track, 
Engage and Effect) and applied it to the SAM operator point of view and over laid it with the different 
connection permutations through the connected subsystems.  
 
 
Figure 5. Extended kill chain 
 
7KLVLVQRWWKHXVXDONLOOFKDLQGHILQLWLRQZKLFKPLJKWFHQWUHLQRQO\WKHEOXHDUHDDV³SODWIRUPVHOI-
SURWHFWLRQ´ DQG ZRXOG FHQWUH RQ WKH SULPDU\ WKUHDW VWDJHV RI WKH ILUH FRQWURO V\VWHP EXW LQVWHDG
extends the kill chain higher up the engagement to pre-engagement thus embracing the whole Air 
Defence System and its intentions.  This embraces more of the integrated nature of an Air Defence 
System (IADS) as well as the concept of how different integrated systems are used as a concept of 
operation permutations.  This is important for developing a countermeasure to interfere with those 
threat intentions directly, when combined with the previous diagrams we can see the connections 
sequences and what we may observe spatially and in the EM spectrum which allows the 
countermeasure effort to be focused on what can be affected and what threat intentions need to be 
focused on at each stage. 
5.  The system view 
At this point the analysis has taken discriminators of components and operational view of 
employment, identifying intentions of the system in a kill chain and now moves to a Systems and 
Technology view point. When the say the SNR-75 Fan Song radar is considered alone it may cause the 
analysis of switches, displays and modes of operation to establish a state model of the components of 
the threat system.  The diagram standard below is taken from UML and shows the system states and 
sub-states that are available.  This is an important step on the way to creating specifications for a 
countermeasure to be effective and towards a computer simulation model in which to test it.  It also 
maps how ELINT observables can be selected and the reason that they may be selected, further 
enhancing the operational view and kill chain analysis permutation and the reasoning for the 
intentions.  Note that the H symbol in UML identifies that a state has a history and will be 
remembered if the state is re-entered and can be used for physical switch positions. The state 
motivations for state change can be identified as the intentions for that state change.  Some of these 
states may have ELINT observables that may be used for trigger initiators for a countermeasure that 
are optimised for that state of the subsystem. 
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Figure 6. S-72 UML State diagram 
From the above state diagram and aligned to ELINT observations a lower level subsystem version 
of a kill chain diagram is shown and is based on swim lane analysis and UML Interaction diagrams. It 
presents within a sub-system context of a component of an Air Defence System how the specific mode 
lines can be sequenced, with alternative permutations with the motivation indicated by ELINT 
observables called mode lines and how they move between the different swim lane intents.  The "sub-
LQWHQWLRQ´NLOOFKDLQVKRZVKRZ(/,17REVHUYDEOHVPD\LQGLFDWHRSHUDtor selections and progress in 
the engagement or reaction to your countermeasure; these can be used for triggering optimised 
countermeasures that are optimised to switch positions and the engagement progresses through 
intentions. 
 
 
Figure 7. Swim lane: Mode line permutation diagram for auto track 
 
It also may be noted that some indication of an expectation of the duration of the mode lines 
observation may be shown, and are implying performance requirements for a countermeasure system 
and for a countermeasure to be effective.  Understanding the mode-lines and the possible order in 
which they can be observed helps to align countermeasure tactics and map onto the ELINT 
discriminators.  While also improving understanding of the operator intent of specific permutation 
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through that chain.  Also, for a temporal assessment for when the countermeasure needs to be effective 
DQLOOXVWUDWLRQRIWKH³3KDVHVRI)OLJKW´GHSLFWLRQFDQEHVKRZQWKDWPD\KLJKOLJKWZKHQDQGKRZWKH
effector / projectile in the engagement is guidHGXQGHUVHSDUDWH³SKDVHVRIIOLJKW´7KLVDJDLQLPSOLHV
performance and timing synchronisation requirements of countermeasure elements against equipment 
and programming capabilities. 
 
Figure 8. ³3KDVHVRIIOLJKW´LOOXVWUDWLRQ 
 
In this illustration we used a generic SAM instead for the Phases of flight as S-75 is command 
guided only.  This diagram demonstrates how a software model for assessment will be configured and 
the timing and events that a countermeasure may need to be effective against the guiding radar or the 
seeker with perhaps guidance laws and type in each phase. This means a number of countermeasures 
can be used that are designed for different intentions to effect different parts of the flight.  These might 
be attached to different mode-line sequence triggers initiator such that the countermeasure becomes re-
active to the operator and phases of flight or are simultaneous against many aspects of the guidance of 
the SAM missile.  When considering the states and modes it is also useful to consider a system block 
diagram that represents the order and precedence of processing within the radar and seeker. Again this 
is not an S-75 example, but instead is part of a Mono pulse Doppler system. 
 
 
Figure 9. Signal and processing block diagram 
 
The processing block diagram is particularly important as many of a threat system: Strengths, 
Capabilities, Weaknesses and Opportunities are exposed from vulnerabilities and hardenings in the 
system design.  This analysis can be tested when capabilities and observations of the system are 
combined and implemented within a Simulation and Modelling environment such as CounterWorX-
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PROTECT.  Representation of the signal processing chain allows for targeting of vulnerabilities 
within the signal processing to be exploited.   
6.  Countermeasure simulation and modelling 
The use of a single software model for threat analysis and countermeasures assessment gives 
consistency from the Weapon System Analysis to countermeasure development processes and takes 
advantage of a common software model representation of the system understanding.  It should be 
noted that the: state model, phases of flight, kill chain, mode line sequences and signal and processing 
chain block diagrams presented here and their information is represent-able into the CounterWorX-
PROTECT Simulation and Modelling system making for a low abstraction of the threat analysis into 
the model. This is useful for validation while not compromising the original threat analysis when fitted 
to a model. The combination of diagramming information provides a representation of the complete 
complex system to prepare a software model in a synthetic engagement environment that simulates the 
complete engagement possibilities and permutations of use.  It therefore may follow that some 
sequences can be completely deterministically repeatable unlike live trials, or control asynchronous 
events such as the lack of synchronisation of equipment or accuracy and uncertainty in human 
operators using stochastic analysis. 
7.  Countermeasure tactic 
7KH DXWKRU¶V HDUOLHU SUHVHQWHG ZRUN LQ  LQ HSLVRGLF VWDWH-full) Countermeasure and Common 
Countermeasure Communication Language (C3L) [6] [7] presented as a framework for Reactive and 
Adaptive countermeasure specifications and its aim for autonomous s\VWHP¶V VHOI-protection.  This 
work was furthered in the University of Lincoln in an MSc degree [2].  The nature of that work 
abstracted the textual countermeasure mark-up language into a graphical Model Driven Architecture 
(MDA) with the view to aiding the bridge of terminology and the view points from three key 
stakeholder groups: Scientists and engineers, Operational crews and mission data programming 
professionals.  The MSc MDA research had literature reviewed and comparatively studied the 
application of established software development diagramming and system engineering methodologies.  
,W LV DOVR QRWHG WKDW ZLWKLQ WKH06F¶V ³)XUWKHU 5HVHDUFK´FKDSWHU  WKDW DQ extension to the C3L 
language could allow the emitter mode-line sequences to be described in a reactive and adaptive way 
and this is a feature of a PhD research project within the University of Sheffield.  
8.  The onion of protection mapping 
Applying the multi-view threat analysis diagramming techniques, which was based on discriminators, 
operational and system views, the Venn diagram of countermeasure design consideration and Spheres 
of Influence can be applied to an onion of protection.  It should be pointed out that when we describe a 
countermeasure design consideration in the Venn diagram it depiFWV WKH FRXQWHUPHDVXUH¶V GHVLJQ
intention and not an ECM jammer technique capability.  For example, in some literature a deception 
countermeasure is a range or velocity gate steal, but it should be noted that the design consideration is 
deception and the ECM techniques are the gate steal as the design consideration may sequence a 
number of ECM techniques into Smart techniques.  The countermeasure design consideration 
indicates the counter intention of a tactic in this case. Shown in the table below is the Onion of 
SURWHFWLRQ¶V /D\HU /HYHOV OD\HU  LV WKH RXWHU PRVW DQG WKH FRXQWHUPHDVXUH GHVLJQ FRQVLGHUDWLRQ
Sphere of Influence mapped with the kill chain intentions: 
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Table 1. Onion of protection layers 
 
Onion Layer 
Kill Chain 
Intention 
Spheres of Influence 
(Dominate Data need) 
CM Design 
Considerations 
Comment 
Layer 1 
Find 
Protected Platform Decreased Detectability Counter the detection or the behaviours 
that would make the protected platform 
standout as a threat this could be by an 
Early Warning, Air Search or Ground 
Control Intercept radar.  Tactic is 
directed directly at the kill chain 
intention and is inconspicuous. Using 
knowledge of own strengths and 
weaknesses. 
Layer 2 
Fix 
Protected Platform Decreased Detectability  
Decoy & Deception 
Counter Target Acquisition or Height 
Finding radars with deception and 
decoying could be used to degrade 
information or counter an altitude fix. 
Layer 3 
Recognise 
Protected Platform 
Weapon System 
Decreased Detectability  
Decoy & Deception 
Distraction 
Denial 
Disruption  
Counter recognition with measures 
directed at causing confusion to 
delaying the assessment of your 
classification or identity, Recognition 
can be based on behaviour or use 
special radar modes like NCI. 
Layer 4 
Track 
Protected Platform 
Weapon System  
 
 
Decreased Detectability 
Decoy & Deception 
Distraction 
Denial 
Disruption 
Counter threat track convergence with 
disruption, distraction and denials, 
could be a Target Acquisition radar or 
higher data rate search mode. 
Layer 5 
Engage 
Defensive Constraints 
Weapon System 
Protected Platform 
Decreased Detectability  
Decoy & Deception 
Distraction 
Denial 
Disruption 
Destruction 
Defeat threat using all capabilities 
available hard and soft kill dependant 
of ROE and is traditional platform self-
protection. May use Break Lock and 
Signal Processing and Tracking 
targeted tactics. 
Layer 6 
Prosecute / 
Effect 
Defensive Constraints 
Weapon System 
Protected Platform 
Decreased Detectability  
Decoy & Deception 
Distraction 
Denial 
Disruption 
Destruction 
Defeat threat using all capabilities 
available hard and soft kill and is 
traditional platform self-protection. 
May use Break Lock and Signal and 
Track Processing targeted tactics and 
may have simultaneous techniques 
employed against seeker and radars.  
9.  Summary and conclusions 
This paper presented some simplified forms of the diagramming techniques for use in analysis of 
complex threats and started with discriminators and associations of complex system components, the 
next set of diagramming techniques centre on the operational view and moved into the System view 
specification that would be used to create a software model, finally the C3L countermeasure 
description language described the countermeasures in a reactive adaptive and re-useable form.   
These representations and the facilities they provide for a mapping to the countermeasures based on 
data needs defined in the Venn diagram onto an onion or protection based on the mapping of 
countermeasure design considerations for a measured response such that the countermeasures are 
provided at higher levels up the kill chain in pre-engagement and help to reserve advertising 
knowledge of classified Weapon system information in the outer layers of the onion of protection.  
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This paper provides a backbone spine for analysis when considering complex air platforms, how to 
counter them incrementally while focused on countering the intention at each incremental layer.  It 
also highlights a collaborative environment in diagramming allowing different stakeholders from 
different views to contribute meaningfully.  Finally, the facility of the analysis as part of an EWOS 
provision are applicable to IADS and A2AD problems analysis. 
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